




Deputy Executive Secretary for 
Economic and Social Development 
Gert Rosenthal 
Deputy Executive Secretary for 
Co-operation and Support Services 




ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
SANTIAGO, CHILE, APRIL 1987 
C E P A L 
Review 
Santiago, Chile Number 31 
CONTENTS 
Note by the Secretariat. 7 
International colloquium on new directions for development planning in market 
economies. 9 
Opening addresses. 9 
Address by Mr. Norberto Gonzalez, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 9 
Address by Mr. César Miquel, Chief, Division for the Regional Programme and the English 
speaking Caribbean countries United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 10 
Address by Mr. Alfredo Costa-Filho, Director-General, Latin American and Caribbean 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES). 12 
Planning for a fresh social and economic dynamic. Latin American and Caribbean Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning. 19 
New directions in planning: an interpretative balance. Eduardo García D'Acuña. 25 
A note on new directions in planning. Brian Van Arkadie. 33 
The need for multiple perspectives in planning. Harold A. Linstone. 43 
Planning in mixed market economies and the paradigms of development: problems and 
options. Rene Villarreal. 51 
Macroeconomic models and planning in the context of an uncertain future: the French 
experience. Paul Dubois. 59 
Long-range development planning. Notes on its substance and methodology. Lars 
Ingelstam. 69 
Beyond indicative planning. Stuart Holland. 75 
Planning Today. Yoshihiro Kogane. 91 
Governability, participation and social aspects of planning. Yehezkel Dror. 95 
Agents of 'development*. Marshall Wolfe. 107 
The State, decision-making and planning in Latin America. Carlos A. de Mattos. 115 
Decentralization and regional development in Latin America today. Sergio Boisier. 133 
Planning and the market during the next ten years in Latin America. Joseph Ramos. 145 
Planning and government. Carlos Matus. 153 
New technological frontiers of management in Latin America. Bernardo Kliksberg. 171 
The validity of the State-as-planner in the current crisis. Adolfo Gurrieri. 193 
The role of the State in Latin America's strategic options. Christian Anglade and Carlos 
Fortin. 211 
Recent ECLAC publications 
CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 
Agents of 
"development" 
Marshall Wolfe * 
The author contends that the analysis of develop-
ment has now entered into a phase of perplexity and 
disillusionment. "Development" of a sort has taken 
place, according to conventional statistical indica-
tors, but seems to have reached an impasse. Neither 
collective nor professional agents have consistently 
played the parts assigned to them in the 1950s and 
1960s. Their meager capacity to influence the course 
of events, the often perverse consequences of their 
efforts to do so, and the failure of most of them even 
to foresee the nature of the many-faceted crises in 
which Latin America now finds itself are of particu-
lar concern. Meanwhile governments and political 
movements, even if convinced that their countries 
need bold innovations in development policy, are 
overwhelmed by the tasks of crisis management and 
baffled by the discredit into which all schools of 
development theory have fallen. The radically criti-
cal movement for "another development" which 
flourished in the 1970s under the stimulus provided 
by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation might have 
been expected to take advantage of this situation. It 
has failed to do so, however, largely because of an 
inability to identify agents capable of carrying out the 
planned transformation, whose importance for 
mankind's well-being has been convincingly demon-
strated. Its main contribution at present seems to be 
more modest, at the local level of popular organiza-
tion and self-management. 
In the author's view, some comfort is to be 
found in the reinvigoration of pluralist democracy in 
the face of the crisis and in a more realistic willing-
ness on the part of potential agents to accept that no 
single category among them has the right or capacity 
to impose infallible prescriptions for "development" 
on society. These trends are examined in the con-
cluding section of the article. 
•Former Director of che Social Development Div-
ision of l-CLAC This article is based on two papers by the 
author: "Participation: the view from above" (CF.PAL 
Review No. 23, August 1984) and "Toward democratic 
alternatives" (E/UiPAL/R.351, 2 August 1984). 
I 
What agents? 
Agents of what? 
One of the several dictionary definitions of 
"agent" satisfies present purposes: "One who 
exerts power or produces an effect". In the dis-
course on development policy up to the present, 
different theorists and ideologists have looked to 
two main kinds of agents: a) collective agents, 
i.e., a class or subclass destined to bring about 
social and economic transformation through the 
pursuit of its own interests; b) a professional 
elite possessing a correct theory and technical 
training, capable of planning transformation in 
line with some broad conception of the national 
interest. Practically all interpretations of devel-
opment look to both kinds of agents, but with 
wide variations in their emphasis on processes 
subject to their own laws and on the feasibility or 
desirability of intervention by political move-
ments or the State under the guidance of profes-
sional agents. Obviously, moreover, different 
ideologies look to quite different collective and 
professional agents, from the industrial entre-
preneur to the proletariat and from the profes-
sional planner to the professional revolutionary. 
Let us first look at the many different catego-
ries of agents that must be taken into account in 
any realistic consideration of development pol-
icy formation and then at some of the implica-
tions of their diversity. In each case, one must 
keep in mind at least three levels of power and 
visibility having differing rationales for action: 
the top leaders, spokesmen and theorists; the 
intermediaries and functionaries; and the rank-
and-file, or mass following. 
II 
Categories of agents 
a) Political leaders: who must form their own 
judgments concerning the desirability and feasi-
bility of development policies, preside over the 
bargaining and compromises needed to get the 
policies under way and try to "sell" the policies to 
their own parties and the wider public. The 
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pitfalls in this role (voluntarism, improvisation, 
and infatuation with personally-chosen and sim-
plistic solutions) have been demonstrated 
repeatedly in the Latin American experience, as 
elsewhere. At the same time, experience has 
demonstrated that effective national policies 
require personification in a leader possessing a 
difficult combination of self-confidence and self-
restraint and able to infuse confidence that the 
major national problems are solvable, that the 
deficiencies of previous ways of conducting pub-
lic affairs can be overcome, and that all legiti-
mate interests can get a hearing. 
b) Planners and other public technocrats: 
who advise on and administer policies on the 
basis of their claims to specialized expertise. 
These agents are in a peculiarly ambiguous 
position at present: the prestige of their exper-
tise has declined, while their numbers have 
increased and the indispensability of their servi-
ces to the State has been augmented by the com-
plexity of the problems now confronted and the 
need to reverse a trend towards deterioration 
and privatization in the State's performance of 
social and economic functions. 
c) Other bureaucrats: who generally try to 
manage the State machinery and the use of pub-
lic resources based on a rationality quite different 
from that of political leaders or planner-
technocrats. 
d) Capitalists and entrepreneurs: a category 
which can be divided into industrialists, financi-
ers, merchants, owners of modern farms and 
agribusinesses, and illicit entrepreneurs (mainly 
involved ¡n drug traffic). These groups fre-
quently overlap but, at the same time, have very 
different immediate interests and demands on 
the State. It can be assumed that future develop-
ment policies worthy of support will try to bring 
these groups under more effective control, will 
stimulate some of them while restricting or 
eliminating others, will curb their export of capi-
tal, and will seek to capture a major part of their 
surplus for public needs. The objective of induc-
ing the agents in these groups to "play a role in a 
concerted planning effort" cannot be given up as 
Utopian, but it will obviously require complex 
bargaining, in which conflict will be more prom-
inent than consensus and in which all parties 
will distrust the motives and tactics of their 
interlocutors. 
e) Managers and other private technocrats: 
a category which is increasingly being interna-
tionalized through the employment of these 
agents by transnational enterprises; their train-
ing is similar to that of category c), and they 
sometimes shift between public and private 
employment. Agents in this category may be 
somewhat more disposed than those of the 
preceding category to negotiate policies with 
their counterparts in the public sector, and this 
introduces a likelihood that bargains may be 
struck with the public while even the political 
leadership may be kept in the dark. 
f) Military officers: a category of agents 
notoriously prone to acting as "terrible simplifi-
ers" of development as well as of national secur-
ity policy under the tutelage of political 
ideologists and economists. These agents are 
probably somewhat chastened by the consequen-
ces of their recent interventions, but the prob-
lem of limiting them to their legitimate 
functions and to a modest share of public resour-
ces will always exist. 
g) Judges and lawyers: another category of 
agents with a rationality of its own, who are in a 
position to check arbitrariness in policy applica-
tion, but also to complicate and delay it. 
h) Trade union leaders: a category now in a 
difficult position, torn between the demands of 
their members and the present incapacity of the 
State or employers to offer them significant 
gains. Their traditional ideologies are in disar-
ray; moreover, they are frequently emerging 
from periods of repression and are often trying 
to rebuild unions in a setting of high 
unemployment. 
Í) Leaders of associations of professionals, 
small businessmen, farmers and other "middle 
class" groups. This category generally combines 
a good deal of reliance on some lines of govern-
ment action with a persistent suspicion that 
government intervention is designed to favour 
unduly the wealthy, the poor, or the bureaucracy 
itself. Some of its components have a formidable 
capacity to block the application of development 
policies perceived as endangering their interests. 
j) Owners of mass communication media, 
editors, journalists, television and radio com-
mentators and other publicists. Ideally, this cate-
gory of agents should offer the general public 
objective information on development problems 
and policies, criticize the policies and expose 
shortcomings in their execution, and maintain a 
forum for debate in which all ideologies and 
interests can make themselves heard. In most of 
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Latin America, at least some of the mass media 
probably perform these functions more satisfac-
torily than do their counterparts in other parts of 
the world. Obviously, no society has come close 
to the ideal, either in the contributions by the 
media to informed democratic discussion of 
development alternatives or in the public's 
receptivity to the contributions that are made. 
Since independent criticism is just as important 
a function as the provision of information, any 
effort by agents of the State to manipulate the 
media in the interest of its current policy must be 
viewed with suspicion. 
k) Academics, intellectuals and "enlight-
ened" opinion in general. A good many 
members of this category shift, in the course of 
national political changes, between the roles of 
independent theorist and critic of development 
policies and the role of planner or technocrat, 
but the roles themselves are obviously quite dis-
tinct. In recent years the numbers of persons 
with an advanced education relevant to develop-
ment policy in universities and independent 
research institutions has increased very consid-
erably. Presumably the experiences of recent 
years have enhanced their capacity to confront 
problems with less dogmatism and subservience 
to imported theories than heretofore. 
1) Leaders and spokesmen of religious 
movements and organizations. This category 
has assumed great importance in confronting 
development policies with the values of human 
rights and social justice and in helping the poor-
est and most powerless strata of society to 
defend their own interests. 
m) Leaders of student organizations. This 
category continually waxes and wanes in its 
capacity to mobilize a mass following and in its 
degree of autonomy from the political factions in 
the national society. It can be expected to con-
tinue to play several contradictory roles: as a 
source of radical criticism and protest against the 
development policies of the State; as an interest-
group defending privileges associated with 
higher education; and as a recruiting ground for 
national political and technocratic leadership. 
n) Leaders and ideologists who reject the 
market-oriented economy and the dominant 
international order, including Marxists and 
other socialists; movements combatting the eco-
logical and cultural disbenefits of the Latin 
American variants of dependent capitalist devel-
opment; and advocates of self-management, co-
operativism, decentralization and community 
autonomy. Within this very diverse and inter-
nally conflictive category, there seems to have 
been a good deal of erosion of faith in a revolu-
tionary seizure of power as the first step to 
authentic development, as well as an increased 
influence of ideologies calling for autonomous 
popular organization, action at the local level, 
and the transformation of values and cultures as 
a requisite for "another development". 
o) Leaders of movements of the rural and 
urban poor. This group is generally localized and 
precarious, vulnerable to repression or manipu-
lation by agents of the State and, frequently, 
dependent on stimuli from categ'ories 1), m) and 
n). 
In practically all of these categories of 
agents, regional and international linkages are 
complex and influential in ways that can be only 
superficially suggested here. Academic training 
abroad, the prestige of theories fashionable in 
the central countries, contacts with organized 
interest-group counterparts, the research and 
advisory activities of international organiza-
tions, the imported content of the press and 
television, the transnationahzation of industry 
and finance, and the increasing scale and diver-
sity of population movements between Latin 
America and the central countries —all these 
factors shape the expectations of the various 
agents and set limits on their thinking. Even the 
localized leadership of the poor may have firmer 
ties with external sources of aid than with 
domestic allies. Even aside from the contradic-
tory messages and definitions of allies and adver-
saries that derive directly from superpower 
rivalries, the external influences are very diverse 
and often deliberately designed to frustrate one 
another. One need only mention the contradic-
tory character of government policies and pri-
vate counter-policies emanating from the 
United States. Care should be taken not to exag-
gerate the dependence of national agents on 
influences from abroad, and significant influen-
ces acting in the other direction can also be 
identified, but any attempt to define the roles of 
"agents" in development must give serious study 
to their international dimensions. 
CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
III 
Problems standing in the way of coherent policies under-
stood and backed by broad coalitions of agents 
A mere listing of the categories of agents which 
have some influence on policy formation —all of 
them being very far from internally unified as 
regards ideologies and perceived interests— 
might well make one despair of the possibility of 
generalizing about "the role they should play in a 
concerted planning effort". Let us try to sum-
marize the problems before seeking a way ahead: 
a) The relatively long history of govern-
mental efforts to mobilize consensus behind 
ambitious development policies and plans is one 
aspect of the present difficulties. Some of these 
efforts have led nowhere, while others have had 
outcomes quite different from those promised. 
The stronger groups in society have good reason 
to rely on their ability to manipulate or sabotage 
policies, while the weaker groups have good 
reason to distrust appeals for shared sacrifices 
and patience. In fact, both try to extricate them-
selves from dependence on national develop-
ment: the strong by exporting their capital, the 
weak by exporting their labour. 
b) The different categories of agents have 
quite different rationales for action and presup-
positions concerning "development", based on a 
combination of habit, ideology and perceived 
self-interest. Even those agents which are most 
articúlate and disposed to broad views of the 
national interest have a weak capacity for intros-
pection and self-criticism regarding the sources 
of their views. Most of them are also over-ready 
to "demonize" the motives of other agents. 
c) In categories of agents involving the lead-
ership of mass followings and complex organi-
zations —including the executive power of the 
State itself— there are generally wide gaps 
among the rationales of the leaders, the interme-
diaries and the base. The leaders tend to exagger-
ate their capacity to control the intermediaries 
and to mobilize the rank and file. 
d) Policy formation up to the present has 
shown a curious juxtaposition of narrow oppor-
tunism and improvisation combined with a faith 
in utopias and infallible prescriptions. Agents 
concerned with broad policy and planning have 
to some extent deluded themselves by focusing 
on imaginary harmonious societies capable of 
applying their prescriptions, and when unable to 
ignore the discrepancies between suppositions 
and realities, they have retreated into ritual 
activities and facade planning. 
e) Until the beginning of the 1980s, the 
record of development in Latin America was 
sufficiently ambiguous so that agents identified 
with a wide range of policies could feel reasona-
bly confident that things would go their way in 
the future. 
Rising levels of production and income, an 
enormous expansion of education and, to a lesser 
extent, of other social services, and the greatly 
enhanced administrative capacity of the State 
seemed to promise that, one way or another, the 
notorious inequities could be corrected in the course 
of continuing economic growth. The argument 
advanced by ECLAC —that Latin America had 
achieved an income level at which it could elimi-
nate extreme poverty by diversion of a modest 
share of increments in the incomes of the better-
off— seemed plausible. Since then, events have 
shaken the confidence of all the key agents. For 
one thing, most of the planners and intellectual 
agents —including those most critical of prevail-
ing styles of development— seem to have been 
taken by surprise by the character of the crises 
and the consequences of growth stimulated by 
lavish external credits. For another, the crisis has 
demonstrated —most glaringly in the case of 
Mexico— that even a long period of satisfactory 
growth as measured by the conventional indica-
tors, political stability, and continuity in the 
main lines of policy can leave the majority of the 
population as badly off as ever and can leave the 
State and society less prepared to cope with 
adversity than at the much lower income levels 
of 40 years ago. To resume sustained growth,, 
even if it is feasible and necessary, can thus 
hardly become once again an aim sufficiently 
inspiring to mobilize the key agents, unless they 
find reason to hope for a quite different pattern 
of growth. 
f) The crises have thus left the governments 
and the agents in the private sector nearly bereft 
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of the development ideologies that served at 
least as a rationalization for their actions and 
have concentrated their attention on improvisa-
tions to stave off economic collapse and political 
upheaval. This means, in the case of the agents 
in the public sector, coping with debt negotia-
tions, stagnant export markets, and the resist-
ance of all strata of society to meeting the costs; 
in the case of the agents in the private sector, it 
means finding ways of defending acquired 
advantages or bare subsistence. 
IV 
The way ahead 
Any effort to proceed beyond this bleak sketch of 
an impasse bristling with conflicts and cross-
purposes risks falling into simplistic exhorta-
tions or "on-the-one-hand-but-on-the-other" 
evasions. The international jokes about expert 
advice of this kind are too well-known to need 
repetition. 
A few suppositions may be made explicit at 
the outset: 
a) No single category of agents can be nomi-
nated for the honour of deus ex machina, and no 
category need be dismissed as altogether irrele-
vant or obstructive. No category of agents is 
going to become so enlightened as to consist-
ently play the role defined for it by planners (not 
even the planners themselves). 
b) For the immediate future, at least, the 
major agents and the forces they represent can 
neither trust each other, dictate to each other, 
nor dispense with each other. One can hope, 
however, that most of them, in differing combi-
nations in individual countries, will take part in 
free and rational public deliberation and, 
through it, reach some degree of mutual under-
standing with respect to viable policies and their 
own role in such policies. The current proposals 
for national pacts and concerted planning 
express this hope. 
c) No style of development, in Latin Amer-
ica or elsewhere, is likely to achieve an ideal 
coherence. The styles most likely to achieve a 
reasonable degree of viability as well as accepta-
bility in terms of human values and rights will be 
those in which the State has no doctrinal objec-
tion to vigorous planned intervention designed 
to redress the shortcomings of the market or, in 
Dr. Raúl Prebisch's words, to the "socialization 
of the surplus", but in which the agents of the 
State also keep in mind their own fallibility and 
the recalcitrance of complex societies to central-
ized direction. Such styles presuppose a perman-
ent tension between sober realism and the 
striving for a new and better order. 
These suppositions have a corollary with 
encouraging as well as discouraging aspects. No 
radically new and convincing prescriptions for 
development are at hand. The present crises may 
eventually lead back to reactionary or radical 
solutions, applied through renewed repression 
or social revolution. However, experience has, 
for most agents, dimmed the appeal of such 
extreme solutions even more than the appeal of 
"developmentalism". If this is so, then the 
governments and agents representing major 
social forces will have to choose among the poli-
cies which they have been trying to carry out, or 
claiming to carry out, since the 1950s or earlier 
and try to apply them more effectively. Many 
such policies faded from public attention during 
the credit-induced complacency of the late 1970s, 
and formulations of these policies remain 
embalmed in the resolutions of I-CI.AC and other 
institutions. They carry with them a burden of 
disillusionment with unhonoured governmental 
promises and lost opportunities. They also, how-
ever, contain a wealth of experience that 
planners and other intellectual agents should be 
studying. Some of them were quite successful as 
long as the distribution of power and the ideo-
logical preferences of those holding power per-
mitted them to function. Others proved 
hopelessly inapplicable or had results quite dif-
ferent from those promised, yet nonetheless 
represent lines of action which national societies 
can hardly avoid entering upon once again. The 
saying that "those who ignore history are con-
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demned to repeat it" comes to mind. Agents may 
be quite justified in resuming many of the lines 
of development policy pursued earlier, but it 
would be inexcusable for them to do so without a 
historical awareness of the past of these policies. 
In fact, Latin America has made enormous 
advances in research and intellectual discourse 
on social, economic and political questions in 
recent years. Repression, economic crisis and 
disillusionment with simplistic prescriptions 
have stimulated as well as obstructed these 
advances. Studies of the functioning of the politi-
cal and economic systems, of the State technocra-
cies and bureaucracies, of the social classes, of the 
features of urbanization and agrarian transfor-
mation, and of the directions of ecological and 
demographic change have all put agents who are 
willing to learn in a better position to under-
stand the environment upon which they are try-
ing to act than they were a few years ago. ECLAC 
and ILPES have been among the major contribu-
tors to these advances. 
Such progress, of course, does not justify 
intellectual hubris. These advances do not lend 
themselves to incontrovertible theories or tac-
tics for the manipulation of society. The realities 
which they address continue to change rapidly. 
They are harder for political leaders as well as 
planners to assimilate than the statistical aggre-
gates and indicators on which most planning has 
relied. The latter, generally based on data of 
dubious reliability supplemented by statistical 
ingenuity, have encouraged the predisposition to 
plan for imaginary societies that are more 
manipuiable than the real ones. An important 
desideratum for the present is to make the 
advances in information and understanding 
more accessible to the general public as well as to 
the agents in leadership and planning positions, 
and to introduce these advances into a free and 
rational public deliberation of possible futures, 
as both a stimulus and a corrective. 
In the discussion of agents of policy and 
planning in settings of economic depression, 
shrinking resources available for distribution, 
subjection to the dictates of external creditors 
and investors, and immediate policy alternatives 
that all seem distasteful, dangerous or inaccessi-
ble, there is a strong temptation to evade one 
issue that has presented itself ever more insist-
ently in Latin America since the beginning of the 
debate on development. This is the issue of auto-
nomous organized participation by the social 
classes and groups which have so far been virtu-
ally excluded from control over their own liveli-
hood and the services that the State provides, 
supposedly for their well-being. This is one of 
the most complex desiderata of an acceptable 
style of development, and it is susceptible to 
many variants of distortion, from the traditional 
populist appeals to the masses, to the regi-
mented and ritualized participatory machinery 
of some socialist States. 
Authentic participation requires the emer-
gence of informed and experienced leaders who 
can represent excluded groups in the national 
political arena and vis-a-vis the agents of the 
State. It also requires continual vigilance by the 
excluded groups in order to control the leaders 
who claim to represent them, as well as a strug-
gle to overcome deeply rooted patterns of clien-
telism and paternalism. Unfortunately, it also 
requires resilience and ingenuity on the part of 
the excluded groups and their leaders in order to 
cope with the periodic repression of their pro-
tests. Experience of such struggles in Latin 
America is extensive, and in recent years aca-
demic, political and religious allies have helped 
some of the excluded towards a historical under-
standing of them, on the whole with more flexi-
ble ideological preconceptions than previously.1 
The rerent regional trend towards political dem-
ocratization gives the excluded groups some-
what more latitude than before in advancing 
their own perceived interests. At the same time, 
since the resources of the State for responding to 
their demands are under rigid constraints 
(except in the sense of the State's disposition to 
encourage or tolerate popular organization), the 
excluded and their allies, may be forced to 
develop a high degree of self-reliance and 
innovativeness. 
Lastly, the furtherance of authentic partici-
pation requires that even the best-i mentioned 
and most technically competent agents within 
the State machinery must restrain their own 
urges to accumulate power and their preoccupa-
'The United Nations Research Institute for Social Develop-
ment, through its Participation Programme, has collaborated with 
national research institutions on a series of studies concerning 
these questions as they relate to different groups in Latin America. 
The reports are in the process of publication by UNRISD in Geneva. 
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tion with standardized norms. "Conscíentiza-
tion" of the poor has long been a goal which 
some of their allies have valiantly striven to 
attain. "Consdentization" of the agents of the 
State is an aspiration of particular importance, 
on the supposition that recent research into 
bureaucracy can be enlightening and that such 
agents have a certain degree of autonomy and 
some capacity for self-criticism. 
